Let's get right to the numbers.  Here's a table showing the classification of players, as of this August, for each team's draft (first three rounds only) from 1990 through this year:

At first glance--and based on this limited data--the performance of the Orioles doesn't seem that bad.  Three stars (in case you're counting, those stars are Mike Mussina, Brian Roberts and Nick Markakis), is more than 21 other major league franchises.  This, however, is only a small part of the story.

The limited raw data above doesn't take into account the quality of the selections each team has had over the years.  It also ignores the "contributors" segment entirely.  Let's look at the second point first.

By my classification, the Orioles have selected two players who fit into the "contributors" category:  Jay Powell and Jeffrey Hammonds.  (Chris Ray received consideration, but given that he's had the equivalent of roughly two full years of major league play and hasn't appeared in a big league game in nearly a year-and-a-half, that would be a presumptuous ranking.  Coming off serious arm surgery and a long layoff, the onus falls on Chris Ray to prove he's capable of contributor-level play moving forward.)  That's the smallest number of any major league franchise--including the four teams who haven't participated in all of the 19 drafts that are part of this analysis.  It's also worth noting that only two of the five star/contributor level players drafted by the Orioles in these 19 drafts were selected after 1993.

The other point deals with draft slotting.  Consider the following table:

Note that the O's average first round/sandwich pick drafting slot--and the average top three round slot--is modestly better than the league (and MLB) average.  Also note that the Orioles had slightly more top five drafting slot picks than the average AL team and significantly more top 10 drafting slot picks than the average AL (and MLB) club.  If you examine the two sets of tables in conjunction with one another you'll see that the teams that have had as little success with picks taken in the first three rounds of the draft as the Orioles have mostly fallen into one of the following categories:

1. significantly fewer overall picks than the Orioles (e.g. Tampa Bay) 

2. significantly worse drafting slots (e.g. Texas)

3. significantly fewer high draft picks (e.g. New York Yankees)

4. some combination of the above (e.g. San Francisco)

It's also worth noting that a number of teams with significantly less to work with, both quantitatively and qualitatively, have had far more success than the Orioles:  Boston, Philadelphia and Atlanta are obvious examples.

It's clear from the above set of tables that some franchises have accumulated far more draft picks than others--a result, largely, of losing highly valued free agents without signing compensatory free agents.  Oakland, Minnesota and Montreal/Washington all accumulated an average of more than four draft picks in the first three rounds over the last 19 years.  (The A's, in fact, averaged more than two first round/sandwich picks per season.)  The Mariners, by contrast, averaged fewer than three and the Angels, Yankees and Phillies barely averaged three picks in the first three rounds.  

The overall rate of success in the draft is hardly linear, as implied above.  The following pair of tables show the percentage of draft picks in the first three rounds that turned into stars or contributors:

Only two major league teams had a combined star/contributor return as bad or worse than the Orioles--the Yankees and the Giants--but both of those teams had less optimal drafting slots overall than the Orioles.  The Yankees had far worse average slots and a fraction of the number of top 5 and top 10 picks.  The Giants' options have been closer to those of the Orioles, but the slot averages are worse and the number of top 5/10 picks fewer.  (Keep in mind that the above percentages are almost certain to rise somewhat, across the board, over time, as more recent draft picks begin to filter into the major leagues in greater numbers.)

It would not be a stretch to conclude, by any means, that the Orioles have pulled less out of the draft, as a function of opportunity, than any other major league franchise.

Looking at the draft record of some of the other teams around the majors, it's pretty clear that franchises can't rely exclusively on upper level draft success to develop consistent winning clubs.  Looking at star production in particular, there's essentially no correlation between stars produced and cumulative on-field success.  On the one hand, this seems counterintuitive, but given that stars are much more likely to be generated by top five overall draft picks, it makes sense:  good teams don't pick at the head of the draft.  And so, teams that have won consistently over the period in question--the Braves, Red Sox and Yankees--have produced, between them, exactly four star players from the first three rounds of the draft over the past 19 years.  The teams have also had a cumulative total of three top five picks in that time frame.

(Evidence that the top five picks of the draft yield the vast majority of the stars per capita:  12 of the 95 top five picks in the 19 drafts in this study were rated as stars (just under 13%).  44 of the other 1861 players drafted in the first three rounds--a bit more than 2%--were classified as stars.  Players drafted 1-5 overall are roughly six times as likely to develop into star caliber players as all other players drafted before the start of the fourth round.)

On the other hand, consistent losers (at least until recently in the case of Tampa Bay) like the Rays, Royals Pirates and Nationals have drafted only three players presently classified as stars despite having 27 top five picks between them.  Some teams seem to have a knack for drafting better than others.  Is it because of insight, luck or better drafting strategy?  We'll try to answer that question, at least in part, in a future installment.

The next installment of the series will examine the value of compensatory sandwich picks and the distinction between specific first round drafting slots.

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